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Abstract
I develop a search-and-bargaining model of liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
where investors di¤er in their search intensities. A distinguishing characteristic of my model
is its tractability: it allows for heterogeneity, unrestricted asset positions, and fully decen-
tralized trade. I nd that investors with higher search intensities (i.e., fast investors) are less
averse to holding inventories and more attracted to cash earnings, which makes the model
corroborate a number of stylized facts that do not emerge from existing models: (i) fast
investors provide intermediation by charging a speed premium, and (ii) fast investors hold
larger and more volatile inventories. Then, I use the model to study the e¤ect of trading
frictions on the supply and price of liquidity. The results have policy implications concerning
the Volcker rule.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical analyses of over-the-counter (OTC) markets point to a high level
of heterogeneity among intermediaries with respect to transaction frequency, terms
of trade, and inventories. 1 Some intermediaries appear to be central in the network
of trades: They trade very often, and hold large and volatile inventories. Moreover,
they face systematically di¤erent terms of trade. In the corporate bond market, for
example, central intermediaries earn higher markups compared to peripheral inter-
mediaries. 2 On the other hand, central intermediaries in the market for asset-backed
securities earn lower markups. 3 In this paper, I provide a theoretical model that
captures the economic incentives of intermediaries which give rise to these empirical
trading patterns.
More precisely, I consider an innite horizon dynamic model, in the spirit of Du¢ e,
Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005), in which investors meet in pairs to trade an asset. I go
beyond the literature by considering investors who can di¤er in their search intensities,
time-varying hedging needs, and asset holdings. I provide an analytical characteriza-
tion of the steady state equilibrium that includes the distribution of asset holdings,
bilateral trade quantities, and prices. The rich heterogeneity in the model allows me
to reproduce the observed trading patterns in OTC markets, and, therefore, provides
a natural laboratory for policy analysis. In a special case of my model, I show that, in
markets where central intermediaries earn higher markups, the further concentration
of intermediation activity in the hands of these central intermediaries is benecial for
social welfare, while it is harmful in markets where central intermediaries earn lower
markups. This suggests that the empirical relationship between markups and central-
ity helps predict the potential e¤ects of regulatory actions, such as the Volcker rule
and MiFID I/II, which aim at reducing the concentration of intermediation activity.
In my model, intermediation arises endogenously as a result of the interaction of
investor heterogeneity and search frictions. I model heterogeneity in search intensity
1 The heterogeneity among intermediaries is documented for the corporate bond market (Hendershott,
Li, Livdan, & Schürho¤, 2015; Di Maggio, Kermani, & Song, 2016; OHara, Wang, & Zhou, 2016),
the municipal bond market (Li & Schürho¤, 2012), the fed funds market (Bech & Atalay, 2010),
the overnight interbank lending market (Afonso, Kovner, & Schoar, 2014), the market for asset-
backed securities (Hollield, Neklyudov, & Spatt, 2014), and the market for credit default swaps
(Siriwardane, 2015).
2 See OHara et al. (2016).
3 See Hollield et al. (2014).
2
among investors as heterogeneity in the number of trading specialists with whom the
investors are endowed. Specialists randomly contact each other to trade a risky asset
on behalf of investors. Thus, in e¤ect, investors with higher number of specialists
have higher search intensities. Conditional on a contact, both price and quantity are
determined endogenously by bilateral bargaining. Importantly, the quantity traded
is endogenous since I do not impose the usual f0; 1g holding restriction of the litera-
ture. This generalization allows me to analyze how nancial intermediaries optimally
manage their inventoriessizes and facilitate trading.
The model can rationalize the trading patterns observed in OTC markets: namely,
the heterogeneity across intermediaries in transaction frequency, terms of trade, and
inventories. I show that "fast investors" (who have higher search intensities) have
relatively stable marginal valuations that are close to the average marginal valuation
of the market, so they become endogenously central. Therefore, as observed in the
data, fast investors hold larger and more volatile inventories to provide intermediation
to slow investors. In return, these fast investors charge a speed premium as the price
of the liquidity they provide. I show that the relationship between the centrality of an
investor and the intermediation markups she earns arises as a result of two competing
e¤ects: stable marginal valuations and speed premium. Her stable marginal valuations
tend to reduce the markups she charges, by making inventory-holding less risky. If
this is the dominant e¤ect, we observe a negative relationship between centrality and
markups. When the speed premium is dominant, we observe a positive relationship
between centrality and markups. I nd that the speed premium is dominant when
search frictions are severe or investors experience liquidity shocks very frequently.
The main analytical di¢ culty posed by this model is keeping track of the endoge-
nous joint distribution of asset holdings, hedging needs, and search intensities. How-
ever, using convolution methods, I show that marginal valuations, terms of trade, and
the rst conditional moment of equilibrium distribution can be found in closed form
up to e¤ective discount rates that solve a functional equation, so that the analysis
remains relatively tractable. I also provide a recursive characterization of higher or-
der conditional moments of the equilibrium distribution. Therefore, one contribution
of this paper to the literature is methodological: It drops the restrictions on asset
positions, without forgoing the investor heterogeneity or fully decentralized trading
structure. With this level of generality, my model o¤ers a workhorse framework, which
allows for further study of positive and normative issues surrounding OTC markets.
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The main mechanism behind di¤erent trading behaviors of fast and slow investors
is that heterogeneity in search intensities leads to heterogeneous e¤ective discount
rates at which investors discount their future expected utility ow. The e¤ective
discount rate is lower for fast investors because they are able to transition to a future
state faster by rebalancing their holdings. This increases the importance of the option
value of search, and decreases the importance of the current utility ow from holding
the asset. In other words, low e¤ective discount rates lead to the lower sensitivity of
marginal valuations to current asset holdings. Therefore, fast investors put less weight
on their asset positions and more weight on their cash earnings when bargaining
with counterparties. Each bilateral negotiation results in a trade size that is more
in line with the slower counterpartys hedging need and a trade price that contains
a premium benetting the faster counterparty. Controlling for the level of marginal
valuation, fast investors provide more intermediation due to this e¤ective discount
rate channel. In addition, fast investors engage in higher simultaneous buying and
selling activity due to the higher intensity of matching with counterparties. However,
the e¤ective discount rate channel leads to an increase in the intermediation level
above and beyond that direct e¤ect. As in the data, not only do fast investors trade
more often, but they also trade larger quantities on average, in each match.
Finally, I present a special case of my model to conduct analytical comparative
statics analysis. Specically, I analyze how a mean-preserving spread of investors
search intensities a¤ects the welfare. Investors trade o¤ between the benet of hedg-
ing and the cost of risk-bearing when they invest in the asset. An increase in the
heterogeneity in search intensities causes the further concentration of intermediation
activity in the hands of those main intermediaries and, in turn, leads to a higher
hedging benet and a higher cost of risk-bearing at the same time. If search frictions
are severe or investors experience liquidity shocks very often, the increase in hedging
benet becomes dominant, and we observe an increase in welfare. Otherwise, the cost
of risk-bearing becomes dominant, and we observe a decline in welfare. This result
relates the welfare impact of concentration to the sign of the relationship between
centrality and markups. In markets with a positive relationship between centrality
and markups (e.g. corporate bond market) the impact of a mean-preserving spread
of search intensities on social welfare turns out to be positive, while it is negative in
markets with a negative relationship between centrality and markups (e.g. the market
for asset-backed securities).
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These results inform the debate on the e¤ects of a section of the Dodd-Frank Act,
often referred as "the Volcker rule," which bans proprietary trading by banks and
their a¢ liates. It is commonly agreed that the Volcker rule e¤ectively reduces the
ability of intermediaries to provide liquidity. 4 Accordingly, in my model, I capture
this in a stylized way by a mean-preserving contraction in search intensities. My model
predicts di¤erent welfare impacts for di¤erent markets. While it would be benecial
for markets with a negative relation between centrality and markups, it would be
harmful for markets with a positive relation between centrality and markups.
1.1 Related literature
A fast-growing body of literature, spurred by Du¢ e et al. (2005), has recently applied
search-theoretic methods to asset pricing. The early models in this literature, such as
Du¢ e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2007), Weill (2008), and Vayanos and Weill (2008), 5
studied theories of fully decentralized markets in a random search and bilateral bar-
gaining environment and used these theories to present a better understanding of the
individual and aggregate implications of distinctively non-Walrasian features of those
markets. These models maintain tractability by limiting the investors to two asset
positions, 0 or 1. Another part of this body of literature, with papers by Gârleanu
(2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2007, 2009), eliminates the f0; 1g restriction on
holdings by introducing a partially centralized market structure. 6 In their frame-
work, investors are able to trade in a centralized market but only infrequently and by
paying an intermediation fee to exogenously designated dealers who have continuous
access to the centralized market. These models show that investorsdecisions at the
intensive margin provide them with the exibility to respond to changes in market
conditions.
My model is the rst model that introduces ex ante heterogeneity in search inten-
sities into a fully decentralized market model with unrestricted asset holdings. To the
4 See Du¢ e (2012b).
5 The framework of Du¢ e et al. (2005) has also been adopted to analyze a number of issues, such as
market fragmentation (Miao, 2006), clientele e¤ects (Vayanos & Wang, 2007), the congestion e¤ect
(Afonso, 2011), commercial aircraft leasing (Gavazza, 2011), liquidity in corporate bond market (He
& Milbradt, 2014), the co-existence of illiquid and liquid markets (Praz, 2014), the liquidity spillover
between bond and CDS markets (Sambalaibat, 2015), the supply of liquid assets (Geromichalos &
Herrenbrueck, 2016), and the endogenous bargaining delays (Tsoy, 2016).
6Other papers that use the same trading framework include Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011),
Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015), Pagnotta and Philippon (2015), and Randall (2015).
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best of my knowledge, in the literature, there are only two other papers with het-
erogeneity in search intensity: Neklyudov (2014) and Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer
(2016). Both restrict the asset positions so that they lie in f0; 1g. Relative to these
models, an important additional insight of my model is that fast investors can di¤er-
entiate themselves from slow investors by o¤ering more attractive trade quantities to
their counterparties. In this way, they can charge a speed premium, and earn higher
markups depending on the level of frictions. In the f0; 1g models, fast investors typi-
cally earn lower markups because of the lower variability of their reservation values.
The combination of unrestricted holdings and fully decentralized trade is essential
for the analysis I conduct because fully decentralized trade is necessary for endogenous
intermediation, and unrestricted holdings are necessary for the study of optimal inven-
tory holding behavior. To my knowledge, there are two papers with this combination.
Afonso and Lagos (2015) study trading dynamics in the fed funds market. In their
model, banks are homogeneous in terms of preferences and search intensities. The ba-
sic insight from their model on "endogenous intermediation" applies to my model as
well. They show that banks with average asset holdings endogenously become "mid-
dlemen" of the market by buying from banks with excess reserves and selling to banks
with low reserves. Relative to Afonso and Lagos (2015), my contribution is to solve for
a stochastic steady-state with two new dimensions of heterogeneity: hedging need and
search intensity. As I explain above, these are important for explaining stylized OTC
market facts and obtaining new policy implications. Cujean and Praz (2015) study
the impact of information asymmetry between counterparties. Although their model
also features unrestricted asset holdings and a fully decentralized market structure,
my work is di¤erent from theirs in that they assume all investors have the same search
intensity. In order to analyze the microstructure of OTC markets, I introduce search
heterogeneity but keep the usual symmetric information assumption of the literature.
Then, I study the resulting topology of trading relations.
My paper is also related to the literature on the trading networks of nancial
markets. Recent works include Babus and Kondor (2012), Farboodi (2014), Gof-
man (2011), Malamud and Rostek (2012), and Wang (2016). Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and
Weill (2015), Chang and Zhang (2015), Colliard and Demange (2014), Farboodi
et al. (2016), Farboodi, Jarosch, and Menzio (2016), Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill
(2014), Neklyudov (2014), Neklyudov and Sambalaibat (2015), and Shen, Wei, and
Yan (2015) develop hybrid models, which are at the intersection of the search and the
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network literatures. The special case of my model with a homogeneous search intensity
can be considered an extension of Hugonnier et al. (2014) with risk-averse investors
and unrestricted asset holdings. They show that investors with average exogenous val-
uations specialize as intermediaries. In my setup with unrestricted holdings, investors
with the "correct" amount of assets become intermediaries rather than the ones who
have the average exogenous valuation. In other words, in my setup, intermediaries
might be "low valuation-low holding," "average valuation-average holding," or "high
valuation-high holding" investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 studies the equilibrium of the model, while Section 4 assesses the empirical
implications of the endogenous asset positions in OTC markets given by the equilib-
rium. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Environment
Time is continuous and runs forever. I x a probability space (
;F ;Pr) and a ltration
fFt; t  0g of sub--algebras satisfying the usual conditions (see Protter, 2004). There
is a continuum of investors with a total measure normalized to 1. There is one long-
lived asset in xed supply denoted by A. This asset is traded over the counter, and
pays an expected dividend ow denoted bymD. There is also a perishable good, called
the numéraire, which all investors produce and consume.
2.1 Preferences
I borrow the specication of preferences and trading motives from Du¢ e et al. (2007).
Investors level of risk aversion and time preference rate are denoted by  and r
respectively. The instantaneous utility function of an investor is u(; a) + c, where
u(; a)  amD   1
2
r

a22D + 2aD

(1)
is the instantaneous quadratic benet to the investor from holding a 2 R units of
the asset when of type  2 [ 1;+1], and c 2 R denotes the net consumption of the
numéraire good. An investors net consumption becomes negative when she produces
the numéraire to make side payments.
This utility specication is interpreted in terms of risk aversion. Since the parameter
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mD is an expected rather than actual dividend ow, this cash ow needs to be adjusted
for risk. The term a22D represents the instantaneous variance of the asset payo¤where
D is the volatility of the asset payo¤. The term 2aD captures the instantaneous
covariance between the asset payo¤ and some background risk with volatility .
Therefore, the investors type  captures the instantaneous correlation between the
asset payo¤ and the background risk. In Appendix A, I derive this quadratic utility
specication from rst principles. 7 I leave the microfoundation of this specication
to the Appendix because the reduced-form imparts the main intuitions without the
burden of derivations.
Importantly, the correlation between the asset payo¤ and the background risk is
heterogeneous across investors, creating the gains from trade. In the context of di¤er-
ent markets, this heterogeneity can be interpreted in di¤erent ways such as hedging
demands or liquidity needs. In the case of a credit derivatives market, for example, the
correlation captures the exposure to credit risk. If a banks exposure to the credit risk
of a certain bond or loan is high, the correlation between the banks income and the
payo¤ of the derivative written on that specic bond or loan will be negative, imply-
ing that the derivative provides hedging to the bank. Therefore, that bank will have
a high valuation for the derivative. Another bank with a short position in the bond
will have a positive correlation and, consequently, a low valuation for the derivative.
I assume that each investors type itself is stochastic. Namely, an investor receives
idiosyncratic correlation shocks at Poisson arrival times with intensity  > 0. Arrival
of these shocks is independent from other stochastic processes and across investors.
For simplicity, I assume that types are not persistent, and upon the arrival of an idio-
syncratic shock, the investors new type is drawn according to the cdf F on [ 1;+1].
2.2 Trade
All trades are fully bilateral. I assume that investors with di¤erent search e¢ ciencies
co-exist in a sense that will now be described.
Following Weill (2008), I assume that investor i is endowed with a measure i of
"trading specialists," who search for other investorstrading specialists for trade op-
7 I assume that investors have CARA preferences over the numéraire good, and they can invest in a
riskless asset traded in a Walrasian market, and in a risky asset traded over the counter. Moreover,
the investor receives a random income whose correlation with the payo¤ of risky asset is . These
assumptions give rise to my reduced-form specication, up to a suitable rst-order approximation.
See Du¢ e et al. (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), and Gârleanu (2009) for a similar derivation.
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portunities. The measure of an investors trading specialists determine how e¢ ciently
she searches. A given specialist nds a counterparty with an intensity  > 0, reecting
the overall search e¢ ciency of the market. Therefore, investor i nds a counterparty
at total instantaneous rate i. Conditional on contact, the counterparty is chosen
randomly from the pool of all trading specialists.
The cross-sectional distribution of the measure of trading specialists is given by
cdf 	 () on [0; 1]. 8 The parameter  is distributed independently from the cor-
relation type  in the cross-section, and from all the stochastic processes in the
model. Each contact between investor (; a; ) and investor (0; a0; 0) is followed by a
symmetric Nash bargaining game over quantity q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] and unit price
P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]. The number of assets the investor (; a; ) purchases is de-
noted by q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]. Thus, she will become an investor of type (; a +
q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; ) after this trade, while her counterparty will become type
(0; a0   q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; 0). The per unit price the investor (; a; ) will pay is
denoted by P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)].
3 Equilibrium
In this section, I dene a stationary equilibrium for this economy. Then, as a bench-
mark case, I solve the Walrasian counterpart of this economy. Finally, I characterize
the stationary decentralized market equilibrium.
3.1 Denition
First, I will dene the investorsvalue functions, taking as given the equilibrium joint
distribution of investor types, asset holdings, and the measure of trading specialists.
Then, I will write down the conditions that the equilibrium distribution satises.
3.1.1 Investors
Let J(; a; ) be the maximum attainable utility of an investor of type (; a; ). In
steady state, the Bellman principle implies that the growth rate of any investors
8 Because scaling  and all s up and down, respectively, by the same factor has no e¤ect, I normalize
the upper bound of the support to 1.
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continuation utility must be the discount rate r (see Du¢ e, 2012a). Thus, it satises
rJ(; a; ) = u(; a) + 
1Z
 1
[J(0; a; )  J(; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

fJ(; a+ q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; )  J(; a; )
 q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]g(d0; da0; d0), (2)
where
fq [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]g
= arg max
q;P
[J(; a+ q; )  J(; a; )  Pq] 12 [J(0; a0   q; 0)  J(0; a0; 0) + Pq] 12 ,
(3)
s.t.
J(; a+ q; )  J(; a; )  Pq  0,
J(0; a0   q; 0)  J(0; a0; 0) + Pq  0.
The rst term on the RHS of the equation (2) is the investors utility ow; the sec-
ond term is the expected change in the investors continuation utility, conditional on
switching types, which occurs with Poisson intensity ; and the third term is the
expected change in the continuation utility, conditional on trade, which occurs with
Poisson intensity 2. The potential counterparty is drawn randomly from the popula-
tion, with the likelihood, 
0

, that is proportional to her measure of trading specialists,
where  =
1R
0
0d	 (0). 9 The joint cdf of the stationary distribution of types, asset
holdings, and search intensities is (0; a0; 0). Terms of trade, q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]
and P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)], maximize the symmetric Nash product (3) subject to the
usual individual rationality constraints.
9 The total matching rate is 2 because the investor nds a counterparty at rate
1R
0

0
 d	
 
0

, and
another investor nds her at rate
1R
0
0 d	
 
0

. This matching function is a variant of the CRS
matching function of Shimer and Smith (2001).
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3.1.2 Market clearing and the distribution of investorsstates
Let (; a; ) denote the joint cumulative distribution of correlations, asset hold-
ings, and the measure of specialists in the stationary equilibrium. Since (; a; )
is a joint cdf, it should satisfy
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
(d; da; d) = 1. (4)
The clearing of the market for the asset requires that
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
a(d; da; d) = A. (5)
Since the heterogeneity in search intensity is ex ante, I impose
Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
(d; da; d) = 	 () (6)
for all  2 supp(	) to ensure that the equilibrium distribution is consistent with the
cross-sectional distribution of s.
Finally, the conditions for stationarity are
 (; a; )(1  F ()) + 
Z
0
aZ
 1
1Z

(d; da; d)F () (7)
 
Z
0
aZ
 1
Z
 1
24 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

Ifq[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]a ag(d0; da0; d)
35(d; da; d)
+
Z
0
1Z
a
Z
 1
24 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

Ifq[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]<a ag(d0; da0; d)
35(d; da; d) = 0
for all (; a; ) 2 supp().
The rst term of the rst line is the outow due to idiosyncratic shocks. In-
vestors who belong to (; a; ) receive correlation shocks at rate , and they
leave (; a; ) with probability 1 F (), i.e., if their new type is higher than .
Similarly, the second term of the rst line is the inow due to idiosyncratic shocks.
Investors who do not belong to (; a; ) but have an asset holding less than a
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and a total measure of specialists less than  receive correlation shocks at rate ,
and they enter (; a; ) with probability F (), i.e., if their new type is less than
.
The second line represents the outow due to trade. Conditional on a contact,
investors who belong to (; a; ) leave (; a; ) if they buy a su¢ ciently high
number of assets, i.e., if they buy at least a a units where a is the number of assets
before trade. Similarly, the third line represents the inow due to trade. Investors who
do not belong to (; a; ) but have a correlation less than  and a total measure
of specialists less than  enter (; a) if they sell a su¢ ciently high number of
assets, i.e., if they sell at least a   a units, where a is the number of assets before
trade. Note that selling at least a   a units is equivalent to buying at most a   a
units, and hence I write q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] < a   a inside the indicator function.
A stationary equilibrium is dened as follows:
Denition 1 A stationary equilibrium is (i) a pricing function P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)],
(ii) a trade size function q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)], (iii) a function J(; a; ) for con-
tinuation utilities, and (iv) a joint distribution (; a; ) of types, asset holdings,
and the measure of specialists, such that
 Steady-state: Given ii), iv) solves the system (4)-(7).
 Optimality: Given i), ii), and iv), iii) solves the investors problem (2) subject to
(3).
 Nash bargaining: Given iii), i) and ii) satisfy (3).
3.2 The Walrasian benchmark
I solve the stationary equilibrium of a continuous frictionless Walrasian market as a
benchmark. Then, I use the outcome of this benchmark to better understand the e¤ect
of trading frictions on market outcomes. Since, in this market, every investor can trade
instantly, there is one market-clearing price and all investors with the same correlation
type hold the same number of assets. The ow Bellman equation of investors in this
Walrasian market is
rJW (; a) = u (; a) + 
1Z
 1
max
a0
n
JW (0; a0)  JW (; a)  PW (a0   a)
o
dF (0),
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where PW is the market-clearing price. The rst term is the investors utility ow.
The second term is the expected change in the investors continuation utility, condi-
tional on switching types, which occurs with Poisson intensity . Since investors have
continuous access to the market, they rebalance their holding as soon as they receive
an idiosyncratic shock. The FOC for the asset position and the envelope condition 10
are
JW2 (
0; a0) = PW
and
rJW2 (; a) = u2 (; a) + 

 JW2 (; a) + PW

,
where u2 (:; :) represents the partial derivative with respect to the second argument.
Combining these two conditions, I get the optimal demand of the investor with :
aW (;PW ) =
1
2D

mD
r
  PW

  
D
.
The market-clearing condition
1Z
 1
aW (;PW )dF () = A
implies that the equilibrium objects are:
aW () = A  
D
(  )
for all  2 supp(F ); and
PW =
u2 (;A)
r
=
mD
r
  2DA  D,
where
 
1Z
 1
0dF (0) .
The implication of the equilibrium is intuitive: The equilibrium holding is a decreas-
ing function of correlation . As  increases, the hedging benet of the asset decreases
and investors hold less of it. The investor with the average correlation holds the per
10To write down these conditions, I assume that JW (; :) is strictly concave and continuously di¤er-
entiable. This assumption is veried ex post.
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capita supply. The coe¢ cient of the current correlation in the optimal holding is 
D
.
The volatility of the background risk, , has a positive impact on the dispersion of
investorsholdings because they have a higher incentive to hold or stay away from
the asset when their background is more volatile. On the other hand, the volatility
of the asset payo¤, D, has a negative impact on the dispersion of investorsholdings
because the importance of the cost of risk-bearing relative to the hedging demand
rises when the asset payo¤ is more volatile. Thus, investorspositions become closer
to each other as required by e¢ cient risk-sharing.
The instantaneous trading volume in the Walrasian market is
VW = 
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
aW (0)  aW () dF () dF (0) =  
D
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
j0   j dF () dF (0) .
This is basically the multiplication of the ow of investors who receive idiosyncratic
shock, , and the change in the optimal holding of those investors. When I charac-
terize the OTC market equilibrium, I will show that the Walrasian market outcomes
di¤er markedly from the OTC outcomes. As a preview, in the Walrasian equilibrium,
(i) there is no price dispersion, (ii) no one provides intermediation (apart from the
Walrasian auctioneer), and, therefore, (iii) net and gross trade volume coincide.
Finally, I calculate the sum of all investorscontinuation utilities as a measure of
welfare, following Gârleanu (2009):
WW =
mD
r
A  
2
D
2
A2   DA+
2
2
var [] .
The last term of the welfare exclusively captures the hedging benet from being
able to access the centralized market instantly following an idiosyncratic shock. The
frictions of the OTC market will a¤ect the welfare through this term.
3.3 Characterization
3.3.1 Individual trades
Terms of individual trades, q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] and P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)], are de-
termined by a bargaining game, à la Nash (1950), with the solution given by the
optimization problem (3). I guess and verify that J(; :; ) is continuously di¤eren-
tiable and strictly concave for all  and . This allows me to set up the Lagrangian of
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this problem, and nd the rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions (see Theorem
M.K.2., p. 959, and Theorem M.K.3., p. 961, in Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995)
for optimality by di¤erentiating the Lagrangian. The trade size, q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)],
solves
J2(; a+ q; ) = J2(
0; a0   q; 0), (8)
where J2 represents the partial derivative with respect to the second argument. Notice
that the quantity which solves the equation (8) is also the maximizer of the total trade
surplus, i.e.,
q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] = arg max
q
J(; a+q; ) J(; a; )+J(0; a0 q; 0) J(0; a0; 0).
The continuous di¤erentiability and strict concavity of J(; :; ) guarantees the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the trade quantity q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]. Then, the transac-
tion price, P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)], is determined such that the total trade surplus is
split equally between the parties:
P =
J(; a+ q; )  J(; a; )  (J(0; a0   q; 0)  J(0; a0; 0))
2q
(9)
if J2(; a; ) 6= J2(0; a0; 0); and P = J2(; a; ) if J2(; a; ) = J2(0; a0; 0). Substi-
tuting the trade quantity and price into (2), I get
rJ(; a; ) = u (; a) + 
1Z
 1
[J(0; a; )  J(; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

1
2

max
q
fJ(; a+ q; )  J(; a; )
+J(0; a0   q; 0)  J(0; a0; 0)g] (d0; da0; d0). (10)
In order to solve for J(; a; ), I follow a guess-and-verify approach. The complete
solution is given in the Appendix. In the models with f0; 1g holding, investorstrad-
ing behavior is determined by their reservation value, which is the di¤erence between
the value of holding the asset and that of not holding the asset. The counterpart of
the reservation value in my model with unrestricted holdings is the marginal contin-
uation utility or the marginal valuation, in short. To nd the marginal valuation, I
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di¤erentiate the equation (10) with respect to a, applying the envelope theorem:
rJ2(; a; ) = u2 (; a) + 
1Z
 1
[J2(
0; a; )  J2(; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1

0

fJ2(; a+ q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; )  J2(; a; )g(d0; da0; d0),
(11)
where
u2(; a) = mD   r2Da  rD.
Since the utility function is quadratic, the marginal utility ow is linear. The equation
(11) is basically a ow Bellman equation that has a linear return function with a slope
coe¢ cient independent of . Therefore, the solution J2(; a; ) is linear in a if and
only if q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] is linear in a. Conjecturing that q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] is
linear in a, and that the slope coe¢ cient of a in the marginal valuation is   r2Der() forer () > 0, 11 the FOC (8) implies that
J2(; a+ q [(; a; ) ; (
0; a0; 0)] ; ) =
er () J2(; a; ) + er (0) J2(0; a0; 0)er () + er (0) , (12)
i.e., the post-trade marginal valuation of both investors is equal to the weighted
average of their initial marginal valuations with the weights being the reciprocal of
the slope coe¢ cient of a in the marginal valuation. Note that the post-trade marginal
valuation will be equal to the midpoint of the investorsinitial marginal valuations if
they are endowed with the same measure of specialists.
In principle, optimal trading rules, interacting in complex ways with the equilibrium
distribution, make a fully bilateral trade model with unrestricted holdings di¢ cult to
solve. So far, the literature has side-stepped this di¢ culty by considering models with
value functions that can be characterized before solving for the endogenous distrib-
ution. This is not the case in my model. As can be seen from (11) and (12), search
intensity interacts with correlation and asset holding in the Bellman equation for the
11These conjectures are veried in the proof of Theorem 1. Here er () is an important endogenous
coe¢ cient that determines the sensitivity of an investors marginal valuation to his current asset
holding; i.e., it e¤ectively determines the cost of inventory holding. Since this coe¢ cient depends on
the speed type, , investors will di¤er from each other in the cross section in terms of their e¤ective
aversion to inventory holding.
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marginal valuation. The problem becomes relatively easy because (i) correlation and
asset holding are in separate terms in the marginal utility, and (ii) the distribution
of correlations and the distribution of search intensities are independent. Thanks to
these assumptions, search intensity interacts only with asset holding. As a result, I
need to solve for the average asset holding conditional on . This creates a xed point
problem which requires solving a linear system for the average asset holding condi-
tional on  and the average marginal valuation conditional on . The equations of
the system come from optimality conditions, steady-state conditions, and the market
clearing. Its unique solution implies that the average asset holding conditional on 
is the supply A, which is independent of ; i.e., the primary e¤ect of heterogeneity
in  will be to a¤ect the variance and the higher order moments of the distribution.
This allows me to obtain the following theorem from Equation (11):
Theorem 1 In any stationary equilibrium, investorsmarginal valuations satisfy
J2 (; a; ) =
mD   r2Da  rD er()+er()+ + (er ()  r) u2(;A)rer () , (13)
where
er () = r + 1Z
0

0

er (0)er () + er (0)d	(0). (14)
And, the average marginal valuation of the market is
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
J2 (; a; )  (d; da; d) =
u2(;A)
r
. (15)
Equation (13) shows that an investors marginal valuation equals the combination
of her current expected marginal utility ow until the next trade opportunity (the rst
three terms) and the expected contribution of the market to her post-trade marginal
valuation (the last term). In this characterization, r=er () has a natural interpreta-
tion as the e¤ective discount rate of an investor with  as it is the actual rate at
which the investor discounts her future expected post-trade marginal utility ow. 12
Although the e¤ective discount rates are not available in closed form for an arbitrary
distribution of the measure of specialists, most of the important qualitative implica-
12 Equation (13) shows that the discount factor in front of the investors future expected marginal
utility after the next trade is er() rer() , which implies an approximate discount rate of rer() .
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tions of heterogeneity in the measure of specialists come from the properties stated
in Lemma 1. In particular, it states that the e¤ective discount rate is a decreasing
function of . An important implication of this combined with (13) is that the mar-
ginal valuation of investors with high  is closer to the average marginal valuation of
the market, controlling for asset holding and hedging need. Therefore, investors with
high  become the natural counterparty for investors with high marginal valuations
and those with low marginal valuations. They buy the assets from investors with
low marginal valuations and sell to investors with high marginal valuations, and thus
become endogenous "middlemen."
Lemma 1 Suppose the support of the distribution 	 is nite. Then, the functioner (), which is consistent with the optimality of the investors problem, exists, is
unique, strictly increasing and strictly concave, and satises
1Z
0
er () d	() = r + 
2
,
where
 
1Z
0
0d	(0).
It is instructive to note that an alternative environment where investors have access
to a centralized market at Poisson arrival times with intensity er ()   r would lead
to the same marginal valuation in (13). After every trade, the trading investors
marginal valuation would be equal to the average marginal valuation of the market.
In this sense, the function er () can be understood as the sum of discount rate, r, and
the (e¤ective) transition rate to the post-trade state. The functional equation (14)
shows two key properties of er (): being increasing and concave. On the one hand, the
measure of trading specialists has a direct linear positive impact on er (). If an investor
is able to nd counterparties very often, she expects to transition to her post-trade
state very quickly, and her marginal valuation should depend more on her expected
post-trade marginal utility ow. Hence, she should discount her expected post-trade
marginal utility at a lower rate. This makes the function er () an increasing function.
On the other hand, equation (12) shows that the post-trade marginal valuation is
closer to the initial marginal valuation of the party with higher er (). Because of this,
a high search intensity dampens the e¤ect of trade on post-trade marginal valuation.
Thus, an indirect negative impact of  on the function er () arises. Consequently, the
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function er () turns out to be an increasing but concave function of .
Again, using the fact that J(; a; ) is quadratic in a, an exact second-order Taylor
expansion shows that:
J(; a+ q; )  J(; a; ) = J2(; a+ q; )q + r
2
D
2er ()q2.
Next, Equation (9) implies
P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] = J2(; a+ q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 
0)] ; )
+
2D
4
q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]
 
rer ()   rer (0)
!
. (16)
i.e., the transaction price is given by the post-trade marginal valuation plus an ad-
justment term. I call the adjustment term the "speed premium" because it always
benets the investor who is able to nd counterparties faster. Note that the trans-
action price will be equal to the post-trade marginal valuation if the trading parties
have the same speed. This formula for the price explains the main mechanism behind
the relation between  and intermediation markups. Due to the rst term, investors
with high  tend to earn lower markups since they have stable marginal valuations
that do not uctuate much in response to changes in asset holding and hedging need.
On the other hand, they earn a premium that is increasing in trade size. Thus, in
equilibrium, if trade sizes are large enough, the second term dominates and fast in-
vestors earn higher markups. If trade sizes are small enough, the rst term dominates
and fast investors earn lower markups. Consequently, my model rationalizes both the
centrality premium and the centrality discount in intermediation markups, which are
empirically documented in distinct works. 13
In equilibrium, investors who trade in high quantities are the ones who have re-
ceived an idiosyncratic shock recently. After the arrival of an idiosyncratic shock, the
investors rst few trades mostly reect her e¤ort to get close to her new ideal asset
position. During this period, she trades in higher quantities than she does when she
is close to her ideal position. Hence, if investors spend too much time following an
idiosyncratic shock until they become close to their new ideal position, fast investors
13 Li and Schürho¤ (2012) and Di Maggio et al. (2016) nd that central dealers earn higher markups
in the municipal bond market and the corporate bond market, respectively. Hollield et al. (2014)
nd that central dealers earn lower markups in the market for asset-backed securities.
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have the opportunity to earn substantial speed premia. Given a distribution of search
intensities and a distribution of correlations, this is determined by the aggregate level
of frictions in the market. More specically, if the intensity of idiosyncratic shocks, ,
is high, and the aggregate search e¢ ciency, , is low, this becomes the case. There-
fore, in markets with a high level of frictions, the speed premium dominates and we
observe a centrality premium in intermediation markups. In markets with a low level
of frictions, we observe a centrality discount in intermediation markups.
The next proposition shows analytically how terms of trade depend on investors
current state.
Proposition 1 Let
(; a; ) = A  a+ 
D
er ()er () +  (  )
denote the e¤ective type of the investor with (; a; ). In any stationary equilibrium,
investorsmarginal valuations, individual trade sizes, and transaction prices are
given by:
J2(; a; ) =
u2(;A)
r
+
r2Der () (; a; ), (17)
q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] =
rer()(; a; )  rer(0)(0; a0; 0)
rer() + rer(0) (18)
and
P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] =
u2(;A)
r
+ r2D
3er()+er(0)
4er() (; a; ) + er()+3er(0)4er(0) (0; a0; 0)er () + er (0) .
(19)
If there were no heterogeneity in  or in , the quantity traded in a bilateral meeting
would depend only on pre-trade asset positions as in Afonso and Lagos (2015). In this
sense, my model generalizes the trading rule of Afonso and Lagos (2015) by showing
that, in my more general model, it depends also on preference parameters (r, ,
D and ) and search e¢ ciency parameters (, , 
0). This e¤ect of the preference
parameters on trading rules is a key channel through which changes in the OTC
market frictions a¤ect trading volume, price dispersion, and welfare, as I will show in
Section 4 when I discuss the empirical implications of the model.
The e¤ective type of Proposition 1 is a su¢ cient statistic for the e¤ect of an in-
vestors current state on her ideal trading behavior. Indeed, the e¤ective type of an
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investor is her ideal trade quantity stemming from optimal hedging behavior. Given
that investors are trying to equalize their marginal valuations by correcting their
holdings,  represents the desired trade quantity. Investors would be able to trade in
these quantities if their counterparties had a constant marginal valuation of u2(;A)
r
,
i.e., (; a; ) satises
J2(; a+ ; ) =
u2(;A)
r
,
where u2(;A)
r
is the average marginal valuation of the market. If the e¤ective type
is 0, the investors marginal valuation is equal to the average marginal valuation
of the market. If she has a negative e¤ective type, she has a lower than average
marginal valuation, and vice-versa. In a bilateral match between investors (; a; )
and (0; a0; 0), ideally the rst party would want to buy (; a; ) units, and the
second party would want to sell  (0; a0; 0) units of the asset. Thus, the realized
trade quantity (18) is a linear combination of the partiesideal trade quantities, with
weights being their e¤ective discount rates. This is an important result because of
its implications for the supply of liquidity services. Because the e¤ective discount
rate, r=er (), is a decreasing function, Equation (18) reveals that the trade quantity
reects the trading need of the slower counterparty to a greater extent. In this sense,
fast investors provide immediacy by trading according to their counterpartiesneeds.
For an investor with a very high , the weight of her ideal trade quantity in the
bilateral trade quantity is very small, so the disturbance her hedging need creates for
her counterparty is very small. Her counterparty is able to buy from or sell to her in
almost exactly the ideal amount. A speed premium in the price arises because of this
asymmetry in how the trade quantity reects the trading need of the counterparties.
Having high  increases the importance of the option value of search and decreases the
importance of the current utility ow from holding the asset. Therefore, fast investors
put less weight on their asset positions and more weight on their cash earnings when
bargaining with a counterparty. Each bilateral negotiation results in a trade size
that is more in line with the slower counterpartys hedging need and a trade price
that contains a premium benetting the faster counterparty. An investor can achieve
the average marginal valuation by trading with the right counterparty (or the right
sequence of counterparties). The key observation here is that if she trades with a
fast counterparty, she will achieve the average marginal valuation relatively quickly.
The trade-o¤ an investor faces is between the fast correction of the asset position
and paying a low price. That is how the speed premium arises optimally. Figure 1
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graphically presents an example of how trade quantity and price arise as the result of
a bilateral negotiation between two investors with di¤erent s.
Figure 1. Sample trade between investors with di¤erent search intensities
In Figure 1, each line represents the marginal valuation as a function of asset
holding given a certain level of correlation. The steeper line represents the marginal
valuation of a slow investor while the atter line represents the marginal valuation of
a fast investor. This is the direct result of Equation (13). Since the e¤ective discount
rate is decreasing in , the slope of the marginal valuation line is lower for investors
with high . Suppose that two blue dots on the graph represent the initial positions
of two investors. If they make contact, the investor on top will be the buyer as she has
a higher marginal valuation. Trade allows investors to move horizontally. Green lines
with arrows show the quantity and the direction of the trade. The joint surplus of this
trade is the sum of the shaded triangular areas. As can be seen, the impact of trade on
the slow investors marginal valuation is higher than the impact of trade on the fast
investors marginal valuation. As a result, the triangle for the fast investor (the seller)
is smaller than the triangle for the slow investor (the buyer). If the price were equal
to the post-trade marginal valuation, the slow investors surplus would be bigger than
the fast investors surplus. That would violate the symmetric Nash bargaining. For
this reason, the fast investor charges a speed premium to equalize the individual trade
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surpluses by extracting surplus from the slow investor. The other case, in which the
fast investor is the buyer, is symmetric. In this case, the price becomes lower than
the post-trade marginal valuation as a result of the speed premium the fast investor
charges.
An advantage of this setup is that the speed premium arises solely due to the
di¤erences in search intensity. In reality, fast investors might be more sophisticated
and have higher bargaining power, and this might give rise to additional premia
in prices. However, I show that the speed premium arises even when there is no
asymmetry in terms of bargaining power.
3.3.2 The joint distribution of types, holdings, and search intensities
For simplicity, I assume that the distribution of correlations has a continuous sup-
port. In this case, the equilibrium conditional distributions of asset holdings have
densities. This assumption is actually not necessary for the full characterization of
the equilibrium distribution, but it simplies the presentation of Proposition 2 as an
intermediate step. Since I have an explicit expression for trade sizes, I can eliminate
indicator functions in Equation (7). Writing the system of steady-state equations in
terms of conditional pdfs ;(a), I derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In any stationary equilibrium, the conditional pdf ;(a) of asset
holdings satises the system
( + 2); (a) = 
1Z
 1
0; (a) dF (
0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
; (a
0)
0;0
 
a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0 + C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
!
da0dF (0) d	 (0) , (20)
for all (; a; ) 2 supp();
1Z
 1
;(a)da = 1 (21)
for all  2 supp(	) and  2 supp(F ); and
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1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
a;(a)dadF ()d	 () = A, (22)
where
C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]  er (0) 
D
 
  er () +    
0   er (0) + 
!
 
" er (0)er ()   1
#
A. (23)
Equation (21) implies that ;(a) is a pdf. Equation (22) is the market-clearing
condition. Equation (20) has the usual steady-state interpretation. The rst term
represents the outow due to idiosyncratic shocks and trade. The second and third
terms represent the inow due to idiosyncratic shocks and the inow due to trade,
respectively. The last term is an "adjusted" convolution (i.e., a convolution after
an appropriate change of variable) since any investor of type (; a0; ) can become
one of type (; a; ) if she meets the right counterparty. The right counterparty in
this context means an investor of type (0; a

1 + er(0)er()    a0 + C [(; ) ; (0; 0)] ; 0).
Proposition 1 immediately implies that the post-trade type of the rst investor will be
(; a; ), and, hence, she will create inow. Since the convolution term complicates the
computation of the distribution function, I will make use of the Fourier transform. 14
I follow the denition of Bracewell (2000) for the Fourier transform:
bg(z) = 1Z
 1
e i2xzg (x) dx,
where bg(:) is the Fourier transform of the function g (:).
Let b;(:) be the Fourier transform of the equilibrium conditional pdf ;(:). Then
the Fourier transform of the equations (20)-(22) are, respectively:
0 =   ( + 2) b; (z) + 
1Z
 1
b0; (z) dF (0) (24)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

e
i2C[(;);(0;0)] z
1+
er(0)er() b;
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA b0;0
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA dF (0) d	 (0)
14 Following Du¢ e and Manso (2007); Du¢ e, Malamud, and Manso (2009, 2014), Du¢ e, Giroux, and
Manso (2010), Andrei (2013), Cujean and Praz (2015), and Andrei and Cujean (2016) also made
use of convolution for distributions in the context of search and matching models.
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for all  2 supp(	),  2 supp(F ) and for all z 2 R;
b;(0) = 1 (25)
for all  2 supp(	) and  2 supp(F ); and
1Z
0
1Z
 1
b0;(0)dF () d	 () =  i2A. (26)
The system (24)-(26) cannot be solved in closed form. However, it facilitates the
calculation of the moments which are derivatives of the transform, with respect to z,
at z = 0. Thus, the system allows me to derive a recursive characterization of the
moments of the equilibrium conditional distribution.
Proposition 3 The following system characterizes all moments of the equilibrium
conditional distributions of asset holdings:
( + 2)E [an j ; ] = E [anj]
+
X
j1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCAE haj2 j ; i
8>>><>>>:
X
k1+k2+k3=j1
0BBB@ j1
k1; k2; k3
1CCCA


D
k1+k2
 
  er () + 
!k1 24 1Z
0
2
0

(
er ()er () + er (0))n (er (0))k1+k2 
1er (0) + 
!k2
(D (; 0))k3 E
h
aj3k2 j 0
i
d	 (0)
359=; (27)
for all  2 supp(	),  2 supp(F ) and for all z 2 R; and
E [a j ] = A (28)
for all  2 supp(	); where
D (; 0) 
 er (0)er ()   1
!"
A+

D
er (0) er ()
(er () + ) (er (0) + )
#
. (29)
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I use this characterization to analyze various dimensions of aggregate market liq-
uidity, such as expected prices, average trade sizes, price dispersion, and welfare.
4 The models implications
4.1 Average holdings, trade sizes and prices
Using the result of Proposition 3, I derive the average asset holdings, trade sizes,
and prices of investors of type (; ). The results are summarized in the following
corollary:
Corollary 1 The average asset holdings, trade sizes, and prices of investors of type
(; ) are given by:
E [a j ; ] = 
 + 2 (er ()  r)A+ 2 (er ()  r) + 2 (er ()  r)
"
A  
D
er ()er () +  (  )
#
,
(30)
E [q j ; ] = 
 + 2 (er ()  r)
"
  er ()  r


D
er ()er () +  (  )
#
, (31)
E [P j ; ] = PW   
 + 2 (er ()  r)
"
(  ) rDer () + 
 
3
4
  er ()  r
2
!#
. (32)
The implication of Equation (30) is intuitive: The average holding is a decreasing
function of correlation . As  increases, the hedging benet of the asset decreases and
investors hold less of it. The investor with average correlation holds the per capita
supply on average. There are two reasons behind the deviation of average OTC hold-
ings fromWalrasian holdings which are derived in Section 3:2: Intensive and extensive
margin e¤ects. To understand the intensive margin e¤ect, I rst dene the "desired
OTC holding" as the holding which equates the investors marginal valuation to the
average marginal valuation of the market. The desired OTC holding of an investor of
type (; ) is A   
D
er()er()+ (  ). This shows the distortion of investorsdecisions
on the intensive margin; i.e., the desired OTC holding is di¤erent from the optimal
Walrasian holding. More specically, the coe¢ cient of current correlation in the de-
sired holding is 
D
er()er()+ instead of D . Investors put less weight on their current
correlation by scaling down the Walrasian weight as previously shown by the par-
tially centralized models of Gârleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). This
is because investors want to hedge against the risk of being stuck with undesirable
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positions for long periods upon the arrival of an idiosyncratic shock. They achieve this
specic hedging by distorting their decisions on the intensive margin. To understand
the extensive margin e¤ect, note that in equilibrium we observe investors who have
recently become of type (; ) but have not had the chance to interact with other
investors. On average, these investors hold A, due to the i.i.d. and non-persistence
of correlation shocks. Equation (30) shows that the average OTC holding is a linear
combination of the desired OTC holding and A. Using this interpretation, the frac-
tion 
+2(er() r) can be broadly considered to be a measure of the distortion on the
extensive margin. When  is nite, this fraction is bigger than 0, and this creates
the second source of the deviation from Walrasian holding. Hence, investorsaverage
asset positions are less extreme than the Walrasian position because of the intensive
and extensive margin e¤ects. This analysis also implies that fast investors hold more
extreme positions (exhibiting larger deviation from A) than slow investors on average
for two reasons. First, since they are able to trade often, their desired asset posi-
tions are more extreme. Second, they are exposed to lower distortion on the extensive
margin so that their positions are relatively closer to the desired position.
From Equation (31), we see that the average trade size is a decreasing function
of correlation . The investor with average correlation has 0 net volume on average.
Investors with higher correlations are net sellers, and investors with lower correla-
tions are net buyers on average. Average individual trade sizes are also less extreme
compared to Walrasian individual trade sizes, since investors trade less aggressively
by putting a lower weight on their current correlation.
Equation (32) reveals that the average price is a decreasing function of correlation .
The investor with average correlation faces the Walrasian price on average. Investors
with higher correlations face lower prices than the Walrasian price, and investors
with lower correlations face higher prices than the Walrasian price. Expected sellers
trade at lower prices, and expected buyers trade at higher prices because their need
to buy or sell is reected in the transaction price through the bargaining process. In
other words, investors with a stronger need to trade, i.e., with high jj, trade at less
favorable terms. This implication is consistent with empirical evidence in Ashcraft
and Du¢ e (2007) in the federal funds market.
To sum up, the overall pricing implications of my model come from the decisions
on the intensive margin: Investorsaverage asset positions are less extreme as they
put less weight on their current valuation and more weight on their future expected
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valuation for the asset, compared to the frictionless case. In other words, net suppliers
of the asset supply less than the Walrasian market, and net demanders of the asset de-
mand less. However, the overall e¤ect on the aggregate demand is zero, and the mean
of the equilibrium price distribution is equal to the Walrasian price. 15 Therefore, my
model complements the results of the existing purely decentralized markets model by
showing that, once portfolio restrictions are eliminated, the pricing impact of search
frictions is low. This result is consistent with the ndings of illiquid market models
such as Gârleanu (2009) and transaction cost models such as Constantinides (1986).
These papers show that infrequent trading and high transaction costs have a rst-
order e¤ect on investorsasset positions, but only a second-order e¤ect on prices, due
to the investorsability to adjust their asset positions. My model demonstrates that a
similar intuition carries over to decentralized markets when there are no restrictions
on holdings.
4.2 Dispersion of marginal valuations and asset positions
Using the result of Proposition 3 evaluated at n = 2, I obtain a linear system
which pins down the conditional variance of asset positions, var [aj], for all  2
f1; :::; Ng. I also derive an equation which relates var [aj] to the conditional vari-
ance of marginal valuations, var [J2 (; a; ) j], using Proposition 1. This analysis
leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 2 The conditional variance of marginal valuations, var [J2 (; a; ) j], is
decreasing in . The conditional variance of asset holdings, var [aj], is increasing
in .
This corollary establishes the lower variability of marginal valuations for fast in-
vestors. The dispersion of marginal valuations among the investors with the same 
stems from the di¤erence in the current hedging need or current asset position. In
other words, it stems from the e¤ect of the current marginal utility ow on marginal
valuations. As fast investors put less weight on their current marginal utility ow
than slow investors do, we observe lower dispersion in fast investorsmarginal val-
uation. This is true even though dispersion of asset positions across fast traders is
15This result is expected to depend on the quadratic specication of u(; a). Indeed, the average
price is una¤ected by frictions since the marginal utility ow is linear in type and asset position.
On the other hand, a more general intuition is underlined here: The asset demands of di¤erent
type of investors are a¤ected di¤erently. Hence, the aggregate demand does not have to be a¤ected
signicantly.
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larger. Therefore, for investors who are trying to correct their holdings, fast investors
become the natural counterparty since their marginal valuations are always close to
the average marginal valuation of the market.
Proposition 1 implies that fast investors trade aggressively according to their coun-
terpartiesneeds. When they meet a buyer, they sell a lot. When they meet a seller,
they buy a lot. This is optimal for fast investors: Deviating from the desired position
is less of a concern for them as they do not expect to spend much time with their
current position. As a result of this, fast investorspositions exhibit large volatility.
Figure 2 shows it graphically. At time 0, a fast and a slow investor start trading with
the same correlation  =  0:19809 <  =  0:16, i.e., both of them have higher taste
for the asset than the market average. Thus, on average, both of them maintain a po-
sition bigger than the per capita supply A = 8; 740. We see that the average position
of the fast investor is more extreme, which is consistent with our discussion in the
last section. As time passes, the two investors bump into other investors randomly
chosen from the equilibrium distribution. As anticipated, the fast investors holding
exhibits higher volatility.
Figure 2. Sample path of asset holdings for two investors with di¤erent
search intensities
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Figure 3 demonstrates the e¤ect of fast investorsvolatile inventories on the cross-
sectional distribution of asset holdings. The conditional distributions of asset positions
for two classes of investors are considered. Both classes have the same correlation
type of  1. Thus, these investors are the ones with highest exogenous valuation
for the asset. The graph reveals the bimodal structure of both distributions. This
stems from the fact that investors with holdings distorted on the extensive margin
and investors with average correct holdings create di¤erent groups. In the example,
investors with holdings distorted on the extensive margin create a group around
A = 8; 740. Slow investorsdensity is higher around A because the expected length of
the period until a trade opportunity after an idiosyncratic shock is higher for them.
The second group reects the fact that the desired holding is di¤erent for fast and
slow investors. Although both investors like the asset, fast investors hold a higher
average position because of the intensive margin e¤ect of the frictions. In addition,
we see that fast investorspositions exhibit larger dispersion. This is due to the higher
volatility in their positions.
Figure 3. Sample equilibrium conditional distribution of asset holdings
for two classes of investors with the same correlation but di¤erent
search intensities
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These results about main intermediation providers holding large and volatile asset
positions in equilibrium have important implications for the e¤ects of a section of the
Dodd-Frank Act, often referred to as "the Volcker Rule," which disallows proprietary
trading by banks and their a¢ liates. Some forms of proprietary trading are exempted
from the Volcker rule, such as those related to market making or hedging. As the equi-
librium of my model reveals, even in a stationary world without speculative trading,
fast investors hold extreme positions as a result of their optimal hedging behavior, and
very volatile positions as a result of market making. Detecting proprietary trading,
which is unrelated to hedging or market making, based on the uctuations in asset
positions would be a very di¢ cult and possibly infeasible task for regulators. Conse-
quently, banks would perceive that they might face a regulatory sanction due to the
imperfections of the criteria and metrics that were proposed to detect non-market-
making proprietary trading. This would possibly reduce their incentive to provide
liquidity. Hence, the elimination of excessive risk-taking by fast investors might come
with a reduction in liquidity provision and in the overall quality of asset allocation
as well. In Section 4:4, I will analyze possible scenarios regarding this issue.
4.3 Trading volume
Figure 4 shows the decomposition of individual instantaneous expected trading vol-
ume assuming that all investors have the same . As the net and gross trading vol-
ume, I report 2 jE0 [q (; 0) j ]j and 2E0 [ jq (; 0)j j ], respectively. 16 Note
that, when everyone has the same , the sole determinants of trade quantity are
the e¤ective types of the trading parties. I label the di¤erence between gross and
net trading volume as intermediation volume as it is caused by simultaneous buying
and selling instead of fundamental trading. Consistent with the ndings of Afonso
and Lagos (2015), Atkeson et al. (2015), and Hugonnier et al. (2014), investors with
average marginal valuations tend to specialize in intermediation. Their incentive for
rebalancing holdings is low. Thus, they engage mostly in simultaneous buying and
selling since it leads to prot due to equilibrium price dispersion. However, investors
with very high or very low marginal valuations engage very little in intermediation
as they are mostly concerned with correcting their holding.
16The characterization of the equilibrium distribution in Proposition 3 allows for the calculation
of the usual moments, but not the absolute moments. Due to this technical di¢ culty, I calculate
E0 [
q  ; 0 j ] numerically only.
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Figure 4. Individual expected instantaneous gross trading volume,
net trading volume, and intermediation volume
Figure 5. Individual expected instantaneous intermediation volume
as a function of asset holding
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Since my model features investor heterogeneity together with unrestricted holdings,
it o¤ers a richer explanation of the relation between the investor heterogeneity and
intermediation behavior. Endogenous intermediation models with f0; 1g holding, such
as Hugonnier et al. (2014) and Shen et al. (2015), show that investors with average
exogenous valuations specialize as intermediaries. My model o¤ers an alternative ex-
planation with an additional dimension, as endogenous asset holding appears to be
an important determinant of the marginal valuations. When asset holding is endoge-
nous, having the average marginal valuation means holding the "correct" amount of
assets, rather than having the average exogenous valuation. Indeed, as can be seen
in Figure 5, any investor with any exogenous valuation can be an intermediary if
her holding is "correct." In other words, in my setup with endogenous holdings, in-
termediaries might be "low valuation-low holding" (red), "average valuation-average
holding" (blue), or "high valuation-high holding" (orange) investors.
Figure 6. Individual expected instantaneous intermediation volume and intermediation
volume per matching rate for investors with di¤erent search intensities
When I introduce heterogeneity in search intensities, heterogeneity is created in
intermediation activity, even controlling for the level of marginal valuation. Fast in-
vestors intermediate more due to the e¤ective discount rate channel (see Figure 6).
Each bilateral negotiation results in a trade size that is more in line with the slower
counterpartys hedging need, and a trade price that contains a speed premium ben-
etting the faster counterparty. It is true that fast investors engage in higher si-
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multaneous buying and selling activity due to the higher intensity of matching with
counterparties. However, the e¤ective discount rate channel leads to an increase in the
intermediation level above that direct e¤ect. Since fast investors trade according to
their counterpartieshedging needs, they provide more intermediation per matching.
4.4 A special case
In order to derive analytical comparative statics, I focus on a special case of the model
with a two-type distribution of search intensities. The following lemma provides the
closed-form formula for the e¤ective discount rates of the two types of investors.
Lemma 2 Suppose the support of the distribution 	 is fs; fg, where f > s and
 f denotes the fraction of investors with f . Then
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Plugging the e¤ective discount rates given by Lemma 2 into the formulas in Corol-
lary 1, I obtain average equilibrium objects in closed form. Then, I plot some com-
parative statics graphs.
When we analyze the average net trade quantity (31), we see that there are compet-
ing forces. On the one hand, the fast investors with holdings distorted on the extensive
margin have high net trade quantities because they trade more aggressively. The more
aggressive trading is due to the fact that the high search intensities make the investor
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less afraid of being stuck with an undesirable position in the future. On the other
hand, high search intensity reduces the average net trade quantity by reducing the
distortion on the extensive margin and by creating a net trade smoothing e¤ect. The
net trade smoothing e¤ect stems from the di¤erence in search intensities. 17 When
two buyers with the same correlation type but di¤erent search intensities meet, the
fast investor will provide liquidity to the slow investor, and hence, will delay satisfying
her own net trading need. In the end, the latter e¤ects dominate and the average net
trade quantity of fast investors is lower. Figure 7 shows the comparative statics with
respect to the fraction of fast investors.
Figure 7. Average net trade quantities as a function of the fraction of fast investors
When we look at the average price (32), we see that it is a decreasing function of
correlation . The group of investors with the correct holding on average faces the
Walrasian price on average. Investors with misallocated holdings face lower prices
than the Walrasian price if they have high correlation types, and face higher prices
if they have low correlation types. In other words, investors with a stronger need to
trade, i.e., with high jj, trade at less favorable terms. We see that the investors 
a¤ects the deviation term from the Walrasian price through three channels. First,
since the measure of distortion on the extensive margin is lower for high  investors,
a high fraction of them trade at the Walrasian price on average. Second, since their
17Note that the functional equation (14) implies that er() r decreases with .
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marginal valuation does not depend much on their current marginal utility ow, their
need to trade is reected by the price to a lesser extent. Finally, there is the e¤ect
of the speed premium. Because of these three factors, high  investorsaverage trade
price is closer to the Walrasian price, while the average trade price of low  investors
deviates a lot. Figure 8 shows the comparative statics with respect to the fraction of
fast investors in the two-type case. In the example, the Walrasian price is 100. As the
fraction of fast investors increases, both buyersand sellersaverage price becomes
closer to the Walrasian price, reecting the increase in liquidity. As overall liquidity
increases, the average speed premium, reected by the di¤erence between the slow
and fast investorsaverage price, decreases. This is intuitive because when there are
more fast traders in the market, slow tradersoutside option is closer to the average
marginal valuation of the market, lowering the trade surplus, and, in turn the speed
premium. In other words, fast investors are able to charge higher speed premia when
they only constitute a concentrated, small part of the market.
Figure 8. Average prices as a function of the fraction of fast investors
Next, I calculate a proxy for intermediation markups conditional on search intensity.
Following the empirical studies, I dene the intermediation markup as the return on
intermediation, i.e., the intermediation prot per unit as a fraction of a benchmark
price. Details of the calculation of markups can be found in Appendix C. Figure 9
shows the comparative statics for the intermediation markups with respect to the
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level of frictions in the market.
Figure 9. The proxy for intermediation markups for slow and fast
investors for various levels of frictions in the market
Given a cross-sectional distribution of search intensities, Figure 9 demonstrates
that the level of frictions in the market is an important determinant of whether there
will be observed a centrality premium or centrality discount in markups. This result
follows from two competing e¤ects: stable marginal valuations for fast investors and
the speed premium they charge. A fast investors stable marginal valuation tends to
reduce the markups she charges by making inventory holding less risky. In a market
with low frictions, i.e., if investors receive trade opportunities frequently relative to
the intensity of their idiosyncratic shocks, this becomes the dominant e¤ect, and we
observe a centrality discount in markups. In a market with high level of frictions,
slow investors extreme aversion toward the inventory risk caused by high search
frictions leads to high trade surpluses when they trade with fast investors. As a result,
fast investors extract substantial surpluses from this type of transactions above and
beyond their actual contribution to surplus creation. Hence, the speed premium e¤ect
becomes dominant and we observe a centrality premium in markups. This result of the
model provides a signicant diagnostic insight to interpret the level of frictions in real-
life OTC markets. The level of frictions in a market is typically hard to measure since
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it is caused by the unobserved features of the market such as the nature of trading
technology and the characteristics of its investor pool. However, my model relates this
unobserved characteristic of markets to the sign of the relationship between centrality
and markup, which is observable as long as the transaction-level data is available.
I conclude this section with comparative static analysis of social welfare with respect
to the heterogeneity in investorssearch intensity. The welfare notion I use is ex ante
welfare, which is dened as the discounted sum of the utility ows of all investors,
W =
1Z
0
e rt
8<:
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0
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1Z
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Any transfer of the numéraire good from one investor to another does not enter W
because of quasi-linear preferences. Using the de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The fundamental sources of welfare in this environment are the hedging benet (the
last term) and the sharing of dividend risk (the fourth term). Intermediation activity
resulting from the heterogenous trading speed of investors enhances the quality of
asset allocation and leads to a higher overall hedging benet. At the same time,
it increases the dispersion in the allocation of dividend risk and creates a negative
impact on the welfare. A mean-preserving contraction of search intensities reduces
the intermediation activity resulting from the heterogenous trading speed. Hence,
the overall hedging benet decreases while the sharing of dividend risk improves.
The welfare impact of the contraction of search intensities is a result of these two
competing e¤ects. In markets with low level of frictions, this contraction is benecial
because in these markets the hedging benet is not very sensitive to intermediation.
When heterogeneity in search intensities decreases, the decline in the hedging benet
is small but the gain from improved dividend risk sharing is relatively large. Therefore,
welfare increases as shown in the right panel of Figure 10. In markets with high level of
frictions, however, the hedging benet is very sensitive to intermediation. Therefore,
welfare becomes lower when the intermediation activity resulting from the trading
speed di¤erentials is lower, as can be seen in the left panel of Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Change in the aggregate welfare as a result of a mean-preserving spread
of search intensities
These results have implications for the Volcker Rule. Du¢ e (2012b) says that "the
market making is inherently a form of proprietary trading. A market maker acquires
a position from its client at one price and then lays o¤ the position over time at an
uncertain average price" (p. 3). He continues by arguing that banning proprietary
trading would e¤ectively make o¤ering market making unattractively risky for banks,
and sooner or later, the lost market making capacity would be compensated, at least
partially, by non-bank providers of liquidity. Following his arguments, in my model, I
capture this in a stylized way by a mean-preserving contraction of search intensities.
Figure 10 shows that my model predicts di¤erent welfare impacts for di¤erent mar-
kets. While it would be benecial for markets with low search frictions, it would be
harmful for markets with high search frictions. Consequently, an important feature of
my model is that it relates this welfare impact of the Volcker rule to an observed char-
acteristic of the markets: the sign of the relationship between centrality and markup.
In markets with the observed centrality premium in markups (e.g. the corporate bond
market), frictions are severe and the Volcker rule is harmful. In markets with the ob-
served centrality discount (e.g. the market for asset-backed securities), frictions are
lower and the Volcker rule is benecial.
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5 Conclusion
OTC markets played a signicant role in the 2007-2008 nancial crisis, as derivative
securities, collateralized debt obligations, repurchase agreements, and many other as-
sets are traded OTC. Accordingly, understanding the functioning of these markets,
detecting potential ine¢ ciencies, and proposing regulatory action have become a fo-
cus of attention for economists and policy makers. This paper contributes to a fast-
growing body of literature on OTC markets by presenting a search-and-bargaining
model à la Du¢ e et al. (2005). I complement this literature by considering investors
who can di¤er in their search intensities, time-varying hedging needs, and asset hold-
ings. By means of its rich heterogeneity, my model accounts for many observed trading
patterns in OTC markets. Investors with higher search intensities (i.e., fast investors)
arise endogenously as the main intermediation providers. Then, as observed in the
data, they hold large and volatile inventories. Depending on the level of frictions, they
can earn higher or lower markups than slow investors. Both are observed in real-life
OTC markets. The models insight into the relation between frictions and the sign
of the relation between centrality and markups has further implications in terms of
welfare. Using parametric examples of my model, I show that the regulations that
aim to limit the role of central intermediaries, such as the Volcker rule, would have
adverse welfare impact on markets with high levels of frictions, while they would be
benecial in markets with low levels of frictions.
This paper leads to several avenues for future research. First, the stationary equi-
librium in this paper is silent about the role of intermediation at times of nancial
distress. Thus, I plan to study the transitional dynamics of intermediation following
an aggregate liquidity shock. The dynamics of the price and supply of liquidity along
the recovery path could inform the debate on optimal policy during crises. Second,
this paper presents a single-asset model. I plan to analyze how intermediation pat-
terns change in a setup with multiple assets. This analysis could lead to interesting
dynamics of liquidity across markets, as maintaining high inventory in one market
would limit an intermediarys ability to provide liquidity in other markets. Finally,
this paper is totally agnostic about why we observe an ex ante heterogeneity in search
intensity. Given that this search heterogeneity is an important source of intermedia-
tion, studying a model with endogenous search intensities would be a worthwhile way
to explore whether the size of the intermediary sector is socially e¢ cient.
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Appendix A. Microfoundations for the quadratic utility ow
Assume that there are two assets. One asset is riskless and pays interest at an ex-
ogenously given rate r. This asset is traded in a continuous frictionless market. The
other asset is risky, traded over the counter, and is in supply denoted by A. This asset
pays a cumulative dividend:
dDt = mDdt+ DdBt, (A.1)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion.
I borrow the specication of preferences and trading motives from Du¢ e et al.
(2007) and Gârleanu (2009). Investors are subjective expected utility maximizers
with CARA felicity functions. Investorscoe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion and time
preference rate are denoted by  and r respectively.
Investor i has cumulative income process i:
dit = mdt+ dB
i
t, (A.2)
where
dBit = 
i
tdBt +
q
1  (it)2dZit . (A.3)
The standard Brownian motion Zit is independent of Bt, and 
i
t captures the instan-
taneous correlation between the payo¤ of the risky asset and the income of investor
i. This correlation is time-varying and heterogeneous across investors. Thus, this het-
erogeneity creates the gains from trade. In the context of di¤erent markets, this het-
erogeneity can be interpreted in di¤erent ways such as hedging demands or liquidity
needs.
I assume that the correlation between an investors income and the payo¤ of risky
asset is itself stochastic. Stochastic processes that govern idiosyncratic shocks and
trade are as described in Section 2.
Let V (W; ; a; ) be the maximum attainable continuation utility of investor of type
(; a; ) with current wealth W . It satises
V (W; ; a; ) = sup
c
Et
24 1Z
t
e r(s t)e csds j Wt = W , t = , at = a
35 , (A.4)
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s.t. dWt = (rWt   ct)dt+ atdDt + dt   P [(t; at; ) ; (0t; a0t; 0t)] dat
dat =
8>>><>>>:
q [(t; at; ) ; (
0
t; a
0
t; 
0
t)] if there is contact with investor (
0
t; a
0
t; 
0
t)
0 if no contact,
(A.5)
where fq [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]g =
arg max
q;P
[V (W qP; ; a+q; ) V (W; ; a; )] 12 [V (W 0+qP; 0; a0 q; 0) V (W 0; 0; a0; 0)] 12 ,
(A.7)
s.t. V (W   qP; ; a+ q; )  V (W; ; a; ),
V (W 0 + qP; 0; a0   q; 0)  V (W 0; 0; a0; 0).
Since investors have CARA preferences, terms of trade are independent of wealth
levels as I will show later. To eliminate Ponzi-like schemes, I impose the transversality
condition
lim
T!1
e r(T t)Et
h
e rWT
i
= 0. (A.8)
To derive the optimal rules, the technique of stochastic dynamic programming is
used following Merton (1971). Assuming su¢ cient di¤erentiability and applying Itos
lemma for jump-di¤usion processes, the investors value function V (W; ; a; ) satises
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
0 = sup
c
f e c + VW (W; ; a; )[rW   c+ amD +m]
+
1
2
VWW (W; ; a; )[
2
 + 2aD + a
22D]
  rV (W; ; a; ) + 
1Z
 1
[V (W; 0; a; )  V (W; ; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
fV (W   q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; ; a+ q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; )
 V (W; ; a; )g 2
0

(d0; da0; d0)g. (A.9)
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Following Du¢ e et al. (2007), I guess that V (W; ; a; ) takes the form
V (W; ; a) =  e r(W+J(;a;)+J) (A.10)
for some function J(; a), where
J =
1
r
 
m +
log r

  1
2
r2
!
(A.11)
is a constant. Replacing into (A.9), I nd that the optimal consumption is
c =   log r

+ r(W + J(; a; ) + J).
After plugging c back into (A.9) and dividing by rV (W; ; a; ), I nd that (A.9)
is satised i¤
rJ(; a; ) = u(; a) + 
1Z
 1
1  e r[J(0;a;) J(;a;)]
r
dF (0)
+
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
1  e rfJ(;a+q[(;a;);(0;a0;0)];) J(;a;) q[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]P [(;a;);(0;a0;0)]g
r
2
0

(d0; da0; d0). (A.12)
Terms of individual trades, q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] and P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)], are
determined by a Nash bargaining game with the solution given by the optimization
problem (A.7). Dividing by V (W; ; a; )
1
2V (W 0; 0; a0; 0)
1
2 , (A.7) can be written as
fq [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]g
= arg max
q;P
[1  e r[J(;a+q;) J(;a;) qP ]] 12 [1  e r[J(0;a0 q;0) J(0;a0;0)+qP ]] 12 ,
s.t.
1  e r[J(;a+q;) J(;a;) qP ]  0
1  e r[J(0;a0 q;0) J(0;a0;0)+qP ]  0.
As can be seen, terms of trade are independent of wealth levels. Solving this problem
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is relatively straightforward: I set up the Lagrangian of this problem. Then using the
rst-order and Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the trade size q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] solves the
equation (8). And, the transaction price P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] is given by the equa-
tion (9) if J2(; a; ) 6= J2(0; a0; 0); and P = J2(; a; ) if J2(; a; ) = J2(0; a0; 0).
Substituting the transaction price into (A.12), I get
rJ(; a; ) = u(; a) + 
1Z
 1
1  e r[J(0;a;) J(;a;0)]
r
dF (0)
+
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
1  e  r2 fJ(;a+q[(;a;);(0;a0;0)];) J(;a;)+J(0;a0 q[(;a;);(0;a0;0)];0) J(0;a0;0)g
r
2
0

(d0; da0; d0), (A.13)
subject to (8).
Equation (A.13) cannot be solved in closed form. Consequently, following Gârleanu
(2009), I use the linearization 1 e
 rx
r
 x that ignores terms of order higher than
1 in [J(0; a; )   J(; a; )]. The same approximation is also used by Biais (1993),
Du¢ e et al. (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Praz (2014), and Cujean and Praz
(2015). Economic meaning of this approximation is that I assume investors are risk
averse towards di¤usion risks while they are risk neutral towards jump risks. The
assumption does not suppress the impact of risk aversion as investorspreferences
feature the fundamental risk-return trade-o¤ associated with asset holdings. It only
linearizes the preferences of investors over jumps in the continuation values created
by trade or idiosyncratic shocks. The approximation yields the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Fix parameters , D and , and let D = D
q
= and  = 
q
=.
In any stationary equilibrium, investors value functions solve the following HJB
equation in the limit as  goes to zero:
rJ(; a; ) = amD   1
2
r

a22D + 2aD

+ 
1Z
 1
[J(0; a; )  J(; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1

0

fJ(; a+ q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; )  J(; a; )
+J(0; a0   q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] ; 0)  J(0; a0; 0)g(d0; da0; d0), (A.14)
subject to (8).
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Ignoring the bars on , D and , the problem is equivalent to the one with the
reduced-form quadratic utility ow.
Appendix B. Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1 and Proposition 2
After substituting the solution of Nash bargaining, the investorsproblem is
rJ(; a; ) = amD   1
2
r

a22D + 2aD

+ 
1Z
 1
[J(0; a; )  J(; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

"
max
q
(
J(; a+ q; )  J(; a; )
2
+
J(0; a0   q; 0)  J(0; a0; 0)
2
)#
(d0; da0; d0).
Conjecture that
J(; a; ) = D () + E () + F () a+G () a2 +H () a+M () 2, (B.1)
implying
J2(; a; ) = F () + 2G () a+H ()  (B.2)
and
J22(; a; ) = 2G () . (B.3)
Therefore, the value function can be written as
J(; a; ) =  G () a2 + J2(; a; )a+D () + E () +M () 2. (B.4)
q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] is given by (8). Using the conjecture,
F () + 2G () a+ 2G () q +H ()  = F (0) + 2G (0) a0   2G (0) q +H (0) 0.
Therefore,
q =
J2(
0; a0; 0)  J2(; a; )
2 (G () +G (0))
.
Substituting back inside the conjectured marginal valuation, the post-trade marginal
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valuation is
J2(; a+q; ) = J2(
0; a0 q; 0) = G () J2(
0; a0; 0)
G () +G (0)
+G (0)
J2(; a; )
G () +G (0)
. (B.5)
P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] is given by (9). Using the fact that J(; a; ) is quadratic in
a, a second-order Taylor expansion shows that:
J(; a+ q; )  J(; a; ) = J2(; a+ q; )q  G () q2.
Then, Equation (9) implies
P =
q
2
(G (0) G ()) + J2(; a+ q; ).
Hence, the terms of trade satisfy the system
q =
J2(
0; a0; 0)  J2(; a; )
2 (G () +G (0))
, (B.6a)
P =
q
2
(G (0) G ()) +G () J2(
0; a0; 0)
G () +G (0)
+G (0)
J2(; a; )
G () +G (0)
. (B.6b)
Using (B.5) and (B.6a), the implied trade surplus is
J(; a+ q; )  J(; a; ) + J(0; a0   q; 0)  J(0; a0; 0)
=  G ()

2aq + q2

+ J2(; a+ q; ) (a+ q)  J2(; a; )a
 G (0)

 2a0q + q2

+ J2(
0; a0   q; 0) (a0   q)  J2(0; a0; 0)a0
=  (J2(
0; a0; 0)  J2(; a; ))2
4 (G () +G (0))
.
Rewrite the investorsproblem by substituting the trade surplus implied by the
Nash bargaining solution:
rJ(; a; ) = amD   1
2
r

a22D + 2aD

+ 
1Z
 1
[J(0; a; )  J(; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

8<: (J2(0; a0; 
0)  J2(; a; ))2
8 (G () +G (0))
9=;(d0; da0; d0). (B.7)
Therefore, my conjectured value function is veried after substituting the Nash bar-
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gaining solution. The marginal valuation satises the ow Bellman equation:
rJ2(; a; ) = mD   r

a2D + D

+ 
1Z
 1
[J2(
0; a; )  J2(; a; )]dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

(
J2(
0; a0; 0)  J2(; a; )
4 (G () +G (0))
2G ()
)
(d0; da0; d0). (B.8)
Taking all terms which contain J2(; a; ) to the LHS,
0@r +  + 1Z
0

0

G ()
G () +G (0)
d	(0)
1A J2(; a; ) = mD   r a2D + D
+
1Z
 1
J2(
0; a; )dF (0) +
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1

0

G ()
G () +G (0)
J2(
0; a0; 0)(d0; da0; d0).
Substitute the conjectured marginal valuation and match coe¢ cients:
( + er ()) (F () + 2G () a+H () )
= mD r

a2D + D

+
1Z
 1
[F () + 2G () a+H () 0] dF (0)+(er ()  r) J2 () ,
where
er ()  r + 1Z
0

0

G ()
G () +G (0)
d	(0),
J2 () 
1R
0
1R
 1
1R
 1

0

G()
G()+G(0)J2(
0; a0; 0)(d0; da0; d0)
er ()  r .
Equivalently,
( + er ()) (F () + 2G () a+H () )
= mD   r

a2D + D

+  (F () + 2G () a+H () ) + (er ()  r) J2 () .
Then, undetermined coe¢ cients solve the system:
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er ()F () = mD + H () + (er ()  r) J2 () , (B.9)er () 2G () =  r2D, (B.10)
( + er ())H () =  rD. (B.11)
Using the resulting G from the matched coe¢ cients, the denition of er () implies
er () = r + 1Z
0

0

 r2D
2er()
 r2D
2er() +  r2D2er(0) d	(
0).
Then, er () satises the recursive functional equation:
er () = r + 1Z
0

0

er (0)er () + er (0)d	(0). (B.13)
Using the matched coe¢ cients,
J2 (; a; ) =
mD   r2Da  rD er()+er()+ + (er ()  r) J2 ()er () , (B.14)
where
J2 () =
1R
0
1R
 1
1R
 1

0

er(0)er()+er(0)J2(0; a0; 0)(d0; da0; d0)er ()  r . (B.15)
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, I need to show that J2 () =
u2(;A)
r
. Using
(B.14):
J2 () =
1R
0
1R
 1
1R
 1

0

er(0)er()+er(0)
264mD r2Da0 rDer(
0)0+er(0)+ +(er(0) r)J2(0)er(0)
375(d0; da0; d0)
er ()  r .
After cancellations, and using the fact that measure of specialists is independent of
idiosyncratic correlation shocks,
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(er ()  r) J2 () =
1Z
0

0

1er () + er (0)

mD   rD  r2DE [a0 j 0] + (er (0)  r) J2 (0) d	(0).
(B.16)
This equation reveals that the expected contribution of the market to an investors
post-trade marginal valuation depends on the mean of equilibrium holdings E [a0 j 0]
conditional on measure of trading specialists. It will be determined when I derive
the rst moment of equilibrium distribution. Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 will be
complete after the proof of Proposition 2. The following lemma constitutes the starting
point of the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 4 Given J2 (), the conditional pdf ; (a) of asset holdings satises the sys-
tem
( + 2); (a) = 
1Z
 1
0; (a) dF (
0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
; (a
0)
0;0
 
a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0  fmD (; 0) + eC [(; ) ; (0; 0)]  eJ (; 0)
!
da0dF (0) d	 (0) ,
where
fmD (; 0)  er (0)  er ()
r2Der () mD,eC [(; ) ; (0; 0)]  
D
 er (0)er () er () + er () +    er (
0) 0 + er (0) + 
!
,
eJ (; 0)  er (0)
r2Der () (er ()  r) J2 () 
1
r2D
(er (0)  r) J2 (0) .
With further simplication,
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( + 2); (a) = 
1Z
 1
0; (a) dF (
0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
; (a
0)
0;0
 
a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0 + C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
!
da0dF (0) d	 (0) ,
where
C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]   fmD (; 0) + eC [(; ) ; (0; 0)]  eJ (; 0) .
Taking the Fourier transform of the steady-state condition above, the rst equation
of Proposition 2 is proven. The second equation comes from the fact that ; (a)
is a pdf. And, the third equation is implied by market clearing. When I deriveeC [(; ) ; (0; 0)], the proof will be complete.
The rst derivative of the Fourier transform evaluated at z = 0 is
( + 2) b0; (0) =
1Z
 1
b00; (0) dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

1
1 + er(0)er()
b0; (0) dF (0) d	 (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

i2C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
1
1 + er(0)er() dF (
0) d	 (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

1
1 + er(0)er()
b00;0 (0) dF (0) d	 (0) .
Therefore, the rst moments satisfy
55
( + 2)E [a j ; ] =
1Z
 1
E [a j 0; ] dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

1
1 + er(0)er() E [a j ; ] dF (
0) d	 (0)
 
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
1
1 + er(0)er() dF (
0) d	 (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

1
1 + er(0)er() E [a j 
0; 0] dF (0) d	 (0) ,
( + 2)E [a j ; ] =E [a j ] + E [a j ; ] 2 (r +   er ())
 
1Z
0
2
0

C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
1
1 + er(0)er() d	 (
0)
+
1Z
0
2
0

1
1 + er(0)er() E [a j 
0] d	 (0) ,
( + 2 (er ()  r))E [a j ; ] =E [a j ]
 
1Z
0
2
0

C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
1
1 + er(0)er() d	 (
0)
+
1Z
0
2
0

1
1 + er(0)er() E [a j 
0] d	 (0) ,
where the second term is
1Z
0
2
0

C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
1
1 + er(0)er() d	 (
0)
=
1Z
0
2
0

1
r2D
"
 
 er (0)er ()   1
!
mD + rD
 er (0)er () er () + er () +    
!
  er (0)er () (er ()  r) J2 () + (er (0)  r) J2 (0)
#
1
1 + er(0)er() d	 (
0) .
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Take expectation over , and substitute out C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]:
(er ()  r)E [a j ] =   1Z
0

0

1
r2D
"
 
 er (0)er ()   1
!
(mD   rD)
  er (0)er () (er ()  r) J2 () + (er (0)  r) J2 (0)
# er ()er () + er (0)d	 (0)
+
1Z
0

0

er ()er () + er (0)E [a j 0] d	 (0) .
And note that the equation (B.16) also connects J2 (
0) and E [a j 0] as a result of
optimality:
(er ()  r) J2 () = (mD   rD)
 
r + er ()   1
!
+
1Z
0

0

1er () + er (0)

 r2DE [a0 j 0] + (er (0)  r) J2 (0) d	(0).
Thus, the last two equations combined with the market-clearing condition
1Z
0
E [a0 j 0] d	(0) = A
pin down E [a j ] and J2 () for all  2supp(	). Since  takes values on a nite set,
it is easy to verify that the conditions imply a non-singular linear system with the
unique solution:
E [a j ] =A,
J2 () =
mD
r
  D  2DA.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. Using this solution,
eJ (; 0) =   er (0)  er ()
2Der ()

mD
r
  D  2DA

,
which implies
C [(; ) ; (0; 0)] = er (0) 
D
 
  er () +    
0   er (0) + 
!
 
 er (0)er ()   1
!
A,
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and the proof Proposition 2 is also complete.
Proposition 1 can be derived as a by-product of the steps in this proof. More
precisely, (17) is derived by substituting J2 () into (B.14). Using the resulting formula
for marginal valuation and (B.10), equations (B.6a) and (B.6b) imply (18) and (19),
respectively.
Using the marginal valuation in Proposition 1, application of the method of unde-
termined coe¢ cients to (B.7) pins down all the coe¢ cients in (B.1):
(r + )M () =
r2
2 (er () + )2 er () (er ()  r) ,
(r + )E () = H ()
1Z
0
2
0

F (0) + 2G (0)A+H (0)   F ()
4 (G () +G (0))
d	 (0) ,
rD () = 

E () +M () 2

+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

8<:  [F (
0) + 2G (0) a0 +H (0) 0   F ()]2
8 (G () +G (0))
9=;(d0; da0; d0).
Therefore, the value function is available in closed form up to the function er ().
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Assuming (; a) is the joint cdf of correlations and asset holdings conditional on
search intensity, rearrangement of the equation (7) yields
0 =  (; a) + 
aZ
 1
1Z
 1
(d; da)F (
)
  2


aZ
 1
Z
 1
24 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
0Ifq[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]a ag0(d0; da0)d	
 
0
35(d; da)
+
2

1Z
a
Z
 1
24 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
0Ifq[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]<a ag0(d0; da0)d	
 
0
35(d; da)
for all  2supp(	). For simplicity, I assume that the distribution of correlations
and the equilibrium conditional distribution of asset holdings have densities. This
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assumption is actually never used but simplies the presentation of the results. I
write the above condition in terms of conditional pdfs, by letting ;(a) denote the
conditional pdf of asset holdings by investors with correlation  and search intensity
:
0 =  
Z
 1
aZ
 1
;(a)dadF () + 
1Z
 1
aZ
 1
;(a)dadF ()F (
)
 2


Z
 1
aZ
 1
24 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
0Ifq[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]a ag0;0(a0)da0dF (0)d	
 
0
35;(a)dadF ()
+
2

Z
 1
1Z
a
24 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
0Ifq[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]<a ag0;0(a0)da0dF (0)d	
 
0
35;(a)dadF ().
Using the expression for trade sizes implied by (B.6a), I can get rid of indicator
functions inside the integrals, using appropriate bounds:
0 =  
Z
 1
aZ
 1
;(a)dadF () + F (
)
1Z
 1
aZ
 1
;(a)dadF ()
  2


Z
 1
aZ
 1
264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a)dadF ()
+
2

Z
 1
1Z
a
264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]Z
 1
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a)dadF (),
where
 [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] = a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0  fmD (; 0) + eC [(; ) ; (0; 0)]  eJ (; 0) ,
fmD (; 0)  er (0)  er ()
r2Der () mD,eC [(; ) ; (0; 0)]  
D
 er (0)er () er () + er () +    er (
0) 0 + er (0) + 
!
,
eJ (; 0)  er (0)
r2Der () (er ()  r) J2 () 
1
r2D
(er (0)  r) J2 (0) .
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Since this equality holds for any (; a; ), one can take derivative of the both sides
with respect to  using Leibniz rule whenever necessary:
0 =  f()
aZ
 1
;(a)da+ f(
)
1Z
 1
aZ
 1
;(a)dadF ()
  2


f()
aZ
 1
264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a)da
+
2

f()
1Z
a
264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]Z
 1
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a)da.
After cancellations,
0 =  
aZ
 1
;(a)da+ 
1Z
 1
aZ
 1
;(a)dadF ()
  2


aZ
 1
264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a)da
+
2

1Z
a
264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]Z
 1
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a)da.
Similarly, take derivative with respect to a using Leibniz rule whenever necessary:
0 =  ;(a) + 
1Z
 1
;(a
)dF ()
 2


aZ
 1
24  1 + er (0)er ()
! 1Z
0
1Z
 1
00;0( [(
; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)])dF (0)d	 (0)
35;(a)da
  2


aZ
 1
264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a)
+
2

1Z
a
24 1 + er (0)er ()
! 1Z
0
1Z
 1
00;0( [(
; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)])dF (0)d	 (0)
35;(a)da
  2


264 1Z
0
1Z
 1
[(;a;);(0;a0;0)]Z
 1
00;0(a
0)da0dF (0)d	 (0)
375;(a).
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After simplication, the Lemma is derived.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Restate the equation (14):
er () = r + 1Z
0

0

er (0)er () + er (0)d	(0),
where er () > 0 for all  2supp(	) from the strict concavity of the value function.
The functional equation, in turn, implies that er () > r for all  2supp(	). First,
lets establish the existence and uniqueness of the solution of this functional equation.
Rewrite:
er () = r + 1Z
0

0

d	(0)  er () 1Z
0

0

1er () + er (0)d	(0).
Rearrangement yields an alternative representation of the functional equation:
er () = r + 
1 +
1R
0

0

1er()+er(0)d	(0)
.
Since I assume a nite support, let supp(	) = f1; 2; :::; Ng with  n denoting
the fraction of investors with n for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng. And let ern = er (n) for all
n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng. Dene the mapping T : [0;1)N ! [0;1)N such that
(T er)n = max
8>>><>>>:r;
r + n
1 +
NP
k=1
n
k

1ern+erk k
9>>>=>>>; .
[0;1)N with the usual sup norm constitutes a real Banach space. And, the set [0;1)N
is a strongly minihedral cone itself (see Krasnoselskiµ¬, 1964). Thus, the solution
of the functional equation is a non-zero xed point of T on a strongly minihedral
cone. Theorem 4:1 of Krasnoselskiµ¬(1964) shows that every monotone mapping on
a strongly minihedral cone has at least one non-zero xed point. It is easy to verify
the monotonicity of T , i.e. erA; erB 2 [0;1)N and erA  erB imply T erA  T erB. Hence,
61
the existence of the solution of the functional equation is established.
To show the uniqueness, I follow Theorem 6:3 of Krasnoselskiµ¬(1964), which states
that every u0-concave and monotone mapping on a cone has at most one non-zero
xed point. Therefore, it su¢ ces to show that T is u0-concave. By the denition of
u0-concavity, T is u0-concave if there exists a non-zero element u0 2 [0;1)N such
that for an arbitrary non-zero er 2 [0;1)N there exist bl; bu 2 R++ such that
blu0  T er  buu0,
and if for every t0 2 (0; 1) there exists  (t0) 2 R++ such that
T (t0er)  (1 +  (t0)) t0T er.
It can be easily veried from the denition of T that these conditions are satised
for u0 = (r + ; :::; r + ), bl = r (r + )
 1, bu = 1, and  (t0) = (1  t0)

t0 +

2r
 1
.
Hence, the uniqueness of the solution of the functional equation is established as well.
The function er () is strictly increasing if er (0) > er () for all  2supp(	) and
for all 0 2supp(	) with 0 > . To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists
; 0 2supp(	) with 0 > , and er (0)  er (). The equation (14) implies that er (0)
and er () satisfy the following equations respectively:
er (0) = r + 0

1Z
0
00er (00)er (0) + er (00)d	(00)
er () = r + 

1Z
0
00er (00)er () + er (00)d	(00).
As 0 >  and er (0)  er (), the RHS of the second equation is lower than the RHS
of the rst equation, which implies that er (0) > er (); and we obtain the desired
contradiction. Hence, the function er () is strictly increasing.
To show the strict concavity of the function er (), I use the following denition of
strict concavity for functions dened on a nite domain, adapted from Yüceer (2002).
Denition 2 Let S  R be a discrete one-dimentional space. A function f : S ! R
is strictly concave if for all x; y; z 2 S with x < z < y,
f (z) >
y   z
y   xf (x) +
z   x
y   xf (y) .
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Therefore, the e¤ective discount rate function is strictly concave if for all 0; 1; 2 2supp(	)
with 0 < 2 < 1,
er (2) > 1   2
1   0
er (0) + 2   0
1   0
er (1) .
Equivalenty,
1   2
2   0 >
er (1)  er (2)er (2)  er (0) .
Using (14), and using the fact that the function er () is strictly increasing,
er (1)  er (2)er (2)  er (0) =
1R
0
1
0

er(0)er(1)+er(0)d	(0)  1R02 0 er(0)er(2)+er(0)d	(0)
1R
0
2
0

er(0)er(2)+er(0)d	(0)  1R00 0 er(0)er(0)+er(0)d	(0)
<
1R
0
 (1   2) 0 er(0)er(2)+er(0)d	(0)
1R
0
 (2   0) 0 er(0)er(2)+er(0)d	(0)
=
1   2
2   0 .
Hence, the function er () is strictly concave.
To derive the last property of the function er (), take the expectation of the equation
(14):
1Z
0
er () d	() = r + 1Z
0
1Z
0

0

er (0)er () + er (0)d	(0)d	()
= r +
1
2
1Z
0
1Z
0

0

er (0)er () + er (0)d	(0)d	()
+
1
2
1Z
0
1Z
0

0

er ()er () + er (0)d	(0)d	()
= r +
1
2
1Z
0
1Z
0

0

er () + er (0)er () + er (0)d	(0)d	()
= r +
1
2
1Z
0
1Z
0

0

d	(0)d	()
= r +

2
.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
I rst take the Fourier transform of the second line of equation (20):
1Z
 1
24 1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
; (a
0)0;0
 
a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0 + C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
!
da0dF (0) d	 (0)] e i2azda
=
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
; (a
0)
24 1Z
 1
0;0
 
a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0 + C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
!
e i2azda
35 da0dF (0) d	 (0)
=
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
20

; (a
0) e
i2z
1+
er(0)er() f a
0+C[(;);(0;0)]g
266664
1Z
 1
0;0
 
a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0 + C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
!
e
 i2z
1+
er(0)er()

a

1+
er(0)er()

 a0+C[(;);(0;0)]

d
 
a
 
1 +
er (0)er ()
!
  a0 + C [(; ) ; (0; 0)]
!#
da0dF (0) d	 (0)
=
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

; (a
0) e
i2f a0+C[(;);(0;0)]g z
1+
er(0)er() b0;0
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA da0dF (0) d	 (0)
=
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

b0;0
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA e
i2C[(;);(0;0)] z
1+
er(0)er()
264 1Z
 1
; (a
0) e
 i2a0 z
1+
er(0)er() da0
375 dF (0) d	 (0)
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=1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

b0;0
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA e
i2C[(;);(0;0)] z
1+
er(0)er() b;
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA dF (0) d	 (0) .
And using the linearity and integrability of the Fourier transform, Equation (24) is
obtained.
To obtain equations (25) and (26), I use the identities satised by the Fourier
transform (see Bracewell, 2000, p. 152-154) for any function g(x)
bg(0) = 1Z
 1
g(x)dx
and
bg0(0) =  i2 1Z
 1
xg(x)dx
respectively.
n-th conditional moment of asset holdings can be written as follows using the
Fourier transform
E [an j ; ] = ( i2) n
"
dn
dzn
b;(z)
#
z=0
.
Lets rst use equation (24) to nd an expression for d
n
dzn
b;(z):
( + 2)
dn
dzn
b; (z) = 
1Z
 1
dn
dzn
b0; (z) dF (0)
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

dn
dzn
8>><>>:e
i2C[(;);(0;0)] z
1+
er(0)er() b;
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA b0;0
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA
9>>=>>; dF (0) d	 (0)
For the second line, I use the following generalization of the product rule:
dn
dxn
3Y
i=1
gi(x) =
X
j1+j2+j3=n
0BB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCA 3Y
i=1
dji
dxji
gi(x);
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( + 2)
dn
dzn
b; (z) = 
1Z
 1
dn
dzn
b0; (z) dF (0) +
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

X
j1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCA
dj1
dzj1
e
C[(;);(0;0)] i2z
1+
er(0)er() dj2
dzj2
b;
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA dj3
dzj3
b0;0
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA dF (0) d	 (0) ,
( + 2) b(n);(z) = 
1Z
 1
b(n)0;(z)dF (0) +
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

X
j1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCA
(i2C [(; ) ; (0; 0)])j1(
er ()er () + er (0))ne
C[(;);(0;0)] i2z
1+
er(0)er()
b(j2);
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA b(j3)0;0
0B@ z
1 + er(0)er()
1CA dF (0) d	 (0) ,
( + 2) b(n);(0) = 
1Z
 1
b(n)0;(0)dF (0) +
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

(
er ()er () + er (0))n
X
j1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCA

(i2C [(; ) ; (0; 0)])j1 b(j2); (0) b(j3)0;0 (0) dF (0) d	 (0) .
Dividing both sides by ( i2)n:
( + 2)E [an j ; ] = E [anj] +
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

(
er ()er () + er (0))n
X
j1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCAn( C [(; ) ; (0; 0)])j1E haj2 j ; iE haj3 j 0; 0io dF (0) d	 (0) .
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Using the multinomial expansion of ( C [(; ) ; (0; 0)])j1 :
( + 2)E [an j ; ] = E [anj]
+
1Z
0
1Z
 1
2
0

(
er ()er () + er (0))n Xj1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCAE haj3 j 0; 0i
E
h
aj2 j ; 
i X
k1+k2+k3=j1
0BBB@ j1
k1; k2; k3
1CCCA


D
k1+k2   er (0)er () + 
!k1  0er (0)er (0) + 
!k2
D (; 0)k3 dF (0) d	 (0) .
( + 2)E [an j ; ] = E [anj]
+
1Z
0
2
0

(
er ()er () + er (0))n Xj1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCAE haj2 j ; i
X
k1+k2+k3=j1
0BBB@ j1
k1; k2; k3
1CCCA


D
k1+k2
  er (0)er () + 
!k1  er (0)er (0) + 
!k2
D (; 0)k3 E
h
aj3k2 j 0
i
d	 (0) .
( + 2)E [an j ; ] = E [anj]
+ 2
X
j1+j2+j3=n
0BBB@ n
j1; j2; j3
1CCCAE haj2 j ; i X
k1+k2+k3=j1
0BBB@ j1
k1; k2; k3
1CCCA
  er () + 
!k1  
D
k1+k2 1Z
0
0

(
er ()er () + er (0))n
er (0)k1  er (0)er (0) + 
!k2
D (; 0)k3 E
h
aj3k2 j 0
i
d	 (0) .
Applying the law of iterated expectations, the proof is complete.
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B.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Equation (14) implies the system:
er (f ) = r + fs

er (s)er (f ) + er (s)

1   f

+ 
2f
2
 f ,
er (s) = r +  2s
2

1   f

+ 
fs

er (f )er (s) + er (f ) f .
Summing up side by side,
er (f ) + er (s) = 2r+ 2f
2
 f + 
2s
2

1   f

+ 
fs

er (f ) f + er (s) 1   f er (s) + er (f ) .
Using Lemma 1,
er (f ) + er (s) = 2r + 2f
2
 f + 
2s
2

1   f

+ 
fs

r + 
2er (s) + er (f ) .
Then I get the quadratic equation
(er (f ) + er (s))2  
0@2r + E
h
2
i
2
1A (er (f ) + er (s))  fs


r +

2

= 0.
Since er (f ) ; er (s) > 0, the relevant solution is
er (f ) + er (s) = r + E
h
2
i
4
+
vuuut0@r + E
h
2
i
4
1A2 + fs


r +

2

.
Combining this with the equation implied by Lemma 1:
 f er (f ) + 1   f  er (s) = r + 2 ,
I have a system of two equations in two unknowns. Equivalently, the system can be
written as
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er (f ) 1  2 f  =  r + 2

+

1   f
0@r + E
h
2
i
4
1A
+

1   f
vuuut0@r + E
h
2
i
4
1A2 + fs


r +

2

,
er (s) 1  2 f  = r + 2    f
0@r + E
h
2
i
4
1A
   f
vuuut0@r + E
h
2
i
4
1A2 + fs


r +

2

.
When  f 6= 12 , the system gives the e¤ective discount rates immediately. When
 f =
1
2
, I calculate the limit as  f ! 12 using LHospital. The resulting e¤ective
discount rates are
er (f ) =
 

r + 
2

+

1   f
0@r + E[2]
4
+
s
r + 
E[2]
4
2
+ 
fs


r + 
2
1A
1  2 f
and
er (s) =
r + 
2
   f
0@r + E[2]
4
+
s
r + 
E[2]
4
2
+ 
fs


r + 
2
1A
1  2 f
if  f 6= 12 .
er (f ) = 1
2
0BB@r + 2f4 +
vuuut0@r + E
h
2
i
4
1A2 + fs


r +

2
1CCA
  1
8
 (f   s)
0BBBB@ 
E
h
2
i
22
+
  rfs
2
+

1  E[
2]
22

r +
E[2]
4

s
r +
E[2]
4
2
+
fs


r + 
2

1CCCCA
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and
er (s) = 1
2
0BB@r + 2s4 +
vuuut0@r + E
h
2
i
4
1A2 + fs


r +

2
1CCA
+
1
8
 (f   s)
0BBBB@ 
E
h
2
i
22
+
  rfs
2
+

1  E[
2]
22

r +
E[2]
4

s
r +
E[2]
4
2
+
fs


r + 
2

1CCCCA
if  f =
1
2
.
Appendix C. Calculation of markups
The theoretical proxy I use for markup conditional on search intensity is
markup() =
intermediation prot cond. on 
intermediation volume cond. on 
=E [P j ] .
To calculate the numerator, I start by calculating the intermediation prot (or ex-
pense) in a given match, which is
 Pq + eP,
where Pq is the total actual transfer the investors makes to her counterparty,  is the
trade quantity that would occur if the investor did not provide any intermediation
to her counterparty, and eP is the price of that counterfactual transaction without
intermediation. Thus, the instantaneous expected intermediation prot conditional
on  is
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
2
0

( P [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)] q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)]
+ eP (; a; )  (; a; )(d0; da0; d0)(d; da).
Using Proposition 1 and 3, one can show that this is equal to
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1Z
0
2
0

r2D
4
er ()  er (0)
(er () + er (0))2E
h
2 j 
i
d	(0)
+
1Z
0
2
0

r2D
4
3er () er (0) + (er ())2
(er () + er (0))2 er (0) E
h
2 j 0
i
d	(0).
Using Proposition 3 and Lemma 2, it is possible to derive a closed-form expression
for this for the 2-type case. Although the expression looks complicated, it allows for
conducting comparative statics analyses on the entire parameter space easily.
To calculate the denominator of the conditional intermediation markup, we have to
calculate the instantaneous expected intermediation volume conditional on , which
can be written as 18
2
2
8<:
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
1Z
0
1Z
 1
1Z
 1
0

( (; a; )  q [(; a; ) ; (0; a0; 0)])2 (d0; da0; d0)(d; da)
9=;
1=2
,
where 1=2 is used to eliminate the double counting of simultaneous buying and selling
volume associated with the intermediation activity. Using Proposition 1 and 3 and
Lemma 2, it is possible to derive a closed-form expression for this for the 2-type case.
18A more natural way of writing an expression for the intermediation volume would be to use the
absolute moment, instead of using the square root of the second moment. However, the characteriza-
tion of the equilibrium distribution in Proposition 3 allows for the calculation of the usual moments,
but not the absolute moments.
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